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ABSTRACT
My article focuses on the pilot of a Biometric Identity Management System
(BIMS) for the distribution on in-kind aid in Kakuma refugee camp, in
Kenya’s Turkana county, to examine the perception of biometric systems
of verification by refugees. It explores how Somali refugees reflect on
the implications of BIMS for their relations vis-à-vis humanitarian
organizations, the Kenya state and other refugees, making sense of the
humanitarian rationality tasked with both managing and policing
populations in need. It thus argues that biopolitical technologies such as
biometrics highlight, and heighten, the tension between care and
surveillance as refugees challenge the official motives behind biometric
infrastructures with counter-narratives situated in a specific socio-
political milieu. Through an intense interpretative labor, which I captured
in interviews and focus group discussions in Kakuma and Eastleigh,
Nairobi, refugees open a crack in the apolitical veneer of





In June 2013, UNHCR and World Food Program (WFP) launched the pilot of a Biometric Identity Man-
agement System (BIMS) for the distribution of in-kind aid in a sector of Kakuma refugee camp, in
Kenya’s Turkana county. Refugee household heads in Kakuma 3 were urged to register their finger-
prints to be identified at the general food distribution (GFD) points before collecting the packages
with food and other basic items. The rollout of BIMS was expected to have ‘significant cost-
efficiency gains’, as several UNHCR protection officers told me.1
However, the enthusiasm of the implementers of the project was not universally shared in
Kakuma. The launch of the pilot had spread anxiety among refugees in Kakuma 3 and beyond.2 In
meetings held in community centers, refugee leaders expressed their concerns to the UNHCR field
officers who were explaining the logic behind this biometric transition. In October 2013, I attended
two such meetings, one in Kakuma 1 and another in Kakuma 3. In both gatherings, elderly Somali
refugees were particularly vocal. At the time of my fieldwork, Somalis were the second largest popu-
lation of the camp after South Sudanese refugees.3 Aid workers were taken aback when some elders
suggested accompanying the introduction of the biometric registration with an increase in food
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rations. ‘We speak different languages’4, a UNHCR protection officer told me with frustration after a
meeting. In his view, the fact that the refugees would negotiate the acceptance of the biometric
system in exchange for larger packages meant that they failed to grasp the rationale of the pilot –
which, put it as simply as the UNHCR did, was to allow only legitimate refugees to receive the
food rations they were entitled to.
The Somali refugees’ apprehension, nevertheless, had roots that predated the deployment of
BIMS in Kakuma. Since Kenya gained independence from the British rule in 1963, the relation
between the Kenyan state and its large Somali ethnic population, mostly concentrated in the
North-East of the country, has been characterized by suspicion, often erupting into open violence.
The outbreak of a civil war in neighboring Somalia in 1990 and the arrival of hundreds of thousands
displaced people further stirred demographic anxieties in Kenya. More recently, in response to the
threat of terrorism from Somali militants, the government of Kenya (GoK) has increasingly
conflated refugee and security policies, reiterating its intention to have all Somali refugees in the
country confined to refugee camps or back to Somalia. The contestation of BIMS thus suggested
much more than a lack of understanding of the austerity logic of the project.
My article conceptualizes biometrics as an infrastructure of compassionate repression (Fassin,
2005) by asking: what are the factors that influence the way refugees understand biometric
systems of verification? By exploring how Somali refugees reflect on the implications of BIMS for
their relations vis-à-vis humanitarian organizations, the Kenya state and other refugees, I suggest
that grappling with the anticipations and anxieties stirred by the launch of BIMS in Kakuma highlights
the way refugees make sense of the ‘humanitarian reason’ (Fassin, 2012), tasked with both managing
and policing populations in need.
My overall argument is that biopolitical technologies, such as biometrics, highlight, and heighten,
the tension between care and surveillance as refugees challenge the official motives behind biometric
infrastructures with situated counter-narratives. Through intense interpretative labor, which I captured
in interviews and FGDs in Kakuma and Eastleigh, Nairobi, refugees open a crack in the apolitical veneer
of humanitarianism, revealing, and challenging, the politics of biometric. The daily experience of BIMS
and the anticipation of its long-term implications shape the Somali refugees’ perception of the role of
humanitarian agencies, unsettling the precarious balance between protection and control at the core of
humanitarian governance. The participants to my study carried out a reflection on the implications of
BIMS against a backdrop informed by the securitization of refugee policies in Kenya and the political
economy of Kakuma, anticipating the so-called functioncreep of the biometric infrastructure. Further-
more, specific communities within the larger Somali refugee population of the camp emphasized that
the implementation of BIMS would have exacerbated pre-existing power relations. My article focuses in
particular on a group of Somali refugees in Kakuma, hailing from farming and agropastoralist commu-
nities from Southern Somalia, who have been living on themargins of the Somali society since pre-colo-
nial times. Particularly victimized by militias of different factions after the Somali civil war broke out in
1991, and with no other option but seeking succour in UNHCR camps in Kenya, in the 1990s these refu-
gees were lumped together by humanitarian workers under the classification of Somali Bantu, and relo-
cated from Dadaab, the largest refugee camp in Kenya, to Kakuma. Their condition of socio-economic
exclusion has continued into exile, due to a lack of access to employment and business opportunities,
resulting in an overreliance on humanitarian aid.
In developing my argument, I draw on theoretical contributions spanning from critical humanitar-
ianism studies to the literature on biometrics and humanitarian governance to infrastructure studies. I
rely on critical ethnography as the methodology of choice to capture how Somali refugees in Kakuma
understand the introduction of a biometric system of verification to distribute in-kind aid.
My article addresses two knowledge gaps in the relevant literature. On the one hand, despite the
growing popularity of biometrics in humanitarian circles, there has been so far little discussion on the
refugees’ attitude towards biometric systems of identification. On the other, there is a dearth of analysis
on how power differentials within specific refugee communities affect the acceptance and the interpret-
ation of biometrics. I thus contribute to the topic of this special issue by suggesting that what makes a
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digital identity project political is not only the logic behind it but also the ways users make sense of it
through narratives that are informed by historical trajectories and socio-political factors.
While empirically contributing to the discussion on humanitarian biometric systems of identifi-
cation, at a theoretical level my article underlines the polysemic nature of biometric technologies
– meaning that different stakeholders may hold different, and even conflicting, views of them –
and highlights the needs for researchers to account for the interpretive labor that surrounds their
implementation and day-to-day operation.
I begin my article by reviewing and bridging the streams of literature on critical humanitarianism
information systems applied to humanitarian governance and critical infrastructure studies. I then
explain my methodology and describe the empirical setting of my study. After presenting the key




The first body of literature I draw on is critical humanitarianism studies. Scholars such as Fassin (2012),
Agier (2011), Ticktin (2011) and Pallister-Wilkins (2018) have focused their work on the entanglement
of policing and caring, applying a Foucaldian perspective to trace the genealogy and the evolution of
an apparatus entrusted with efficiently managing people affected by displacement crises while pro-
tecting the existing order. This two-prong function is vividly embodied by biopolitical devices such as
migration hotspots (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018) or refugee camps (Agier, 2011), established to both assist
and contain populations displaced by natural or man-made disasters in remote locations (some Greek
islands in the case of migration hotspots, the Turkana region in the case of Kakuma refugee camp) to
spatially reinforce the juridical separation between citizens and refugees.
This scholarship acknowledges that humanitarianism is characterized by the fraught co-habitation of
logics ‘developed to both effectively manage disaster and to secure (in both senses of the word) immi-
nently mobile populations for the maintenance of liberal order alongside and through the securing of
life’ (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). Scholars who focus on how rules, practices and categories shape the entan-
glement of control and protection (Malkki, 2002; Rabinow & Rose, 2006) mobilize the notions of biopo-
litics, broadly defined as the management of life, and biopower, or ‘the ensemble formed by
institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 144) tar-
geting populations through apparatuses of security. In this view, humanitarian governance reflects the
attempts to reconcile or, at least, mitigate the detrimental effects of this tension on the populations of
concern. At the same time, humanitarian organizations provide aid ‘to create and maintain the
impression that humanitarian assistance is distant from state interests’ (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). The
attempts to depoliticize humanitarianism, though, show their limits in what Newhouse (2015) calls
‘humanitarian bargains’ regulating the relations between donors and host states on the one hand,
and humanitarian organizations and refugees on the other. While the former interpretation of huma-
nitarian bargain refers to the pressures placed by donors on host states to contain migration flows, the
latter refers to the trade-offs for refugees, being offeredminimum support in exchange for confinement
in camps. In both forms, there is an asymmetry of power between the parties involved.
As I argue in this article, which is mostly concerned with the latter type of humanitarian bargain,
the integration of digital technologies in the management of life in refugee camps magnifies these
power asymmetries between the humanitarian apparatus and the refugees.
Biometrics and humanitarian governance
The discussion on the integration of digital technologies and humanitarianism has grown increasingly
nuanced in recent years, showing the influence of Foucault’s work on biopolitics (2004) and security
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(2009). The literature on biometrics and humanitarian governance has shown as, particularly since Sep-
tember 11 2001, the usage of biometrics – or the assemblage of technologies to measure, analyse and
process ‘the digital representation of unique biological data and behavioral traits’ (Ajana, 2013a) – has
expanded into several areas, from surveillance and security (Amoore, 2006; Amoore & de Goede, 2008)
to border control (Amoore & Hall, 2009; Crampton, 2019; Duran, 2010) to administration (Martin &
Donovan, 2015). The application of biometrics to immigration and asylum procedures reflects a
broader interest of state security actors to harness digital technologies for what Rose (1999) calls the
‘securitization of identity’ (240). Although this trend has gained momentum since the 1990s, the
usage of technological assemblages to shape processes of inclusion and exclusion is a legacy of colonial
administrative methods aimed at rendering legible, and therefore more manageable, the subjected
populations. In colonial contexts, ‘the recognizing of humans on the basis of intrinsic physical or behav-
ioral traits’ (Maguire, 2009, p. 9) was used for ‘identification, classification, and hierarchisation of bodies,
simultaneously demarcating populations’ (Nishiyama, 2015; see also Pugliese, 2010).
Recent years have seen a proliferation of digital innovations enabling new approaches to address
the ‘identity gap’ in the Global South. (Gelb & Clark, 2013; White et al., 2019). As a result of humani-
tarian budget constraints5, donors’ calls for greater accountability, and falling technology costs,
humanitarian agencies have embraced biometric systems of identification as strategic tools for the
management of populations of concern, addressing the need to make the distribution of limited
resource to refugees more efficient (Jacobsen, 2017). This popularity is due, according to an
Oxfam report, to three types of benefits: identifiability and traceability of the people targeted for
assistance; accuracy and integrity to reduce fraud and duplication; simplicity and efficacy to simplify
registration and identification (The Engine Room and Oxfam, 2018; see also Pilegaard, 2011).
Biometric projects appear thus shaped by rationalities – accountability, audit, capitalism, solution-
ism and securitization – that ‘represent the parallel and often conflicting agendas of different stake-
holders within the aid field’ (Madianou, 2019: 586). Of particular interest for my article are the logics of
solutionism and securitization and the way they influence the deployment of biometric initiatives in
humanitarian spaces. Refugee camps are turned into living labs for experimentation without properly
accounting for the risks associated with each technological component of the biometric assemblage
(a concept with which Madianou refers to the integrated ensemble of biometrics, AI, and blockchain).
Scott-Smith (2016) has coined the expression ‘humanitarian neophilia’ to define a techno-utopian
ideology that ‘combines an optimistic faith in the possibilities of technology with a commitment
to the expansion of markets’ (2230). Sustained by the growing importance of the private sector in
humanitarianism, this trend has influenced discourses, strategies and priorities, as underlined by
the attention that corporate-philanthropic actors are paying to the need to ‘financially include’ refu-
gees (Tazzioli, 2019). Humanitarian organizations, international donors and NGOs are therefore spear-
heading a view of biometrics resting on the idea that technology is merely a means to achieve greater
efficiency in aid distribution and refugee registration, with beneficial implications for humanitarian
protection (Jacobsen & Fast, 2019; see also Read et al., 2016).
However, the diffusion of biometric technologies in humanitarianism has recently come under
mounting criticism. These critiques mostly fall into four groups: reliability, referring to the possibility
of false matches; reusability, or the repurposing of the biometrics data by other actors; security,
related to the loss or theft of data; and social impact, referring to the unintended consequences of
the datafication of identity, such as a greater risk of social exclusion (The Engine Room and
Oxfam, 2018). Jacobsen and Fast (2019) draw attention on the ‘agentic capacity’ and the constitutive
effects of technology to argue that digital technologies and data are transforming humanitarian gov-
ernance, dismantling ‘the boundaries between care and control, emancipation and domination’ (158)
and raising questions on the governance of both technological experimentation and their outcomes
in humanitarian settings (ibid.). The major risk of looking at the mere material dimension of biometric
infrastructures through which data are collected, stored and processed is the depoliticization of dis-
placement and the exacerbation of ‘power inequalities between refugees and humanitarian agencies’
(Madianou, 2019: 583). The work of Btihaj Ajana (2013a, 2013b) bridges the discussions on critical
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humanitarianism and biometrics in humanitarian governance by conceptualizing biometric identity
systems as socio-technical assemblages that reconfigure forms of identity, citizenship and belonging
according to criteria of security and risk management (1). She also stresses the need to ‘challenge the
label of newness that is often stapled on [biometrics] and to draw attention to the fact that the body
has for so long been the subject of control, measurement, classification and surveillance’ (45). In fact,
she argues that we need to situate biometrics within a history of practices and technologies of man-
agement of bodies viewed with suspicion by the political power, concluding that ‘the digitalization
aspect of biometrics has certainly intensified such processes and opened up the body to further
dynamics of power and control.’ (ibid.)
Infrastructure studies
In response to the apolitical reading of donors and humanitarian organizations hailing the efficiency
and traceability afforded by digital infrastructures, the infrastructure studies literature is relevant to
bring politics back in the picture. This debate acknowledges the dual nature of infrastructures as
both ‘things and relations between things’ (Larkin, 2013: 329) and the way their materiality is
entwined to biopolitics (Collier, 2011). Infrastructures spatialize and reproduce political rationalities,
ideologies and ethics by ‘constantly ranking, connecting, and segmenting spaces and people’ (Larkin,
2004: 292; see also Collier, 2011; Donovan, 2015). Beyond the nuts and bolts of the infrastructures lie
their relational nature, articulating the relation between power and subjects and among the users,
and informing the strategies and aspirations of the users. The design, the governance and the
daily operations of the infrastructures produce specific subjects who are disciplined, or compelled,
to adopt behaviors and perform practices that comply with the classificatory logic of the actors
behind the infrastructure. For instance, Von Schnitzler’s (2008) study on the introduction of meters
to regulate water provision in the Soweto township, South Africa, argues that this technological inno-
vation has the twofold aim of reducing water by producing a ‘calculating subject’ (906). Infrastruc-
tures thus influence the way power is deployed, sociality is experienced, and agency is performed.
These three aspects are entangled in Star’s (1999) relational and ecological approach to infrastruc-
tures – meaning that they are defined by the interactions they mediate and are integrated into a
pre-existing environment. In the case of a specific type of infrastructure such as digital systems of
identification for refugees, as I will show in this article, biometric technologies are designed to refor-
mat a more rule-abiding and traceable refugee population.
The dynamics of power and control encapsulated in biometric infrastructures have different impli-
cations for different groups. Nevertheless, the unintended exclusionary aspects of biometrics
systems, related to gender, cultural and power inequalities, are often neglected. The hype surround-
ing biometrics has hitherto eclipsed ‘the lack of evidence demonstrating whether these technologies
actually solve humanitarian problems’ (The Engine Room and Oxfam, 2018). Latonero et al. (2019), for
instance, argues that the technologies and processes involved in digital identity will not provide easy
solutions in the migration and refugee context. Taylor and Broeders (2015) suggest that the lack of
context that often accompanies the digitization of knowledge production risks increasing pre-exist-
ing vulnerabilities. Technologies that rely on identity data introduce a new sociotechnical layer that
may exacerbate existing biases, discrimination, or power imbalances.
As I shall show in the remainder of the article, this aspect emerged against a backdrop character-
ized by the securitization of refugee policies, steeped in the county’s postcolonial history. This volatile
situation had implications also for my methodological choices and for the challenges I met in the
field.
Methodology
I negotiated my access to the Somali refugee population in Kakuma, and in particular to the Somali
Bantu community in Kakuma 3, through relationships I had established in the mostly Somali-
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inhabited estate of Eastleigh, Nairobi, before traveling to the camp. Indeed, this article is part of a
broader research project on the reproduction of relations of power and solidarity within the
Somali diaspora. My fieldwork in Kakuma did not begin with the intent of exploring Somali
refugee attitude to biometrics. It started as an investigation of the mechanisms behind the reproduc-
tion of dominance and marginalization among Somalis in a humanitarian space. In particular, I was
interested in understanding how power relations tracing back to pre-war Somalia, and further exacer-
bated by the eruption of the conflict, were re-spatialised in exile (Iazzolino, 2020). As I was doing
fieldwork in Eastleigh, I was informed of the biometric pilot that UNHCR and WFP were rolling out
in Kakuma during the same period by some of my informants. Hailing from the Somali Bantu com-
munity, they had moved to Nairobi from Kakuma in the first place to leave their food cards with
members of their households still in the refugee camp. Now, they were dismayed by the fact that
the adoption of biometric identification prevented their relatives in Kakuma from accessing much-
needed cash through the sale of extra food rations. I thus set off to Kakuma, where I relied on the
introduction of an INGO and on the contacts with refugees I was given in Eastleigh.
I endeavored to grasp Somali refugees’ nuanced feelings and multi-layered anxieties towards bio-
metrics by relying on an interpretative approach, producing ‘an understanding of the context of the
information system, and the process whereby the information system influences and is influenced by
its context’ (Walsham, 1993, pp. 4–5) and acknowledging the existence of ‘subjective meanings
already there in the social world […] to reconstruct them, to understand them, to avoid distorting
them, to use them as building-blocks in theorizing’ (Goldkuhl, 2012, p. 138). I also drew inspiration
from the critical ethnography literature (Denzin, 2001; Madison, 2012), effectively used in other
studies to understand how marginalized people make sense and interact with ICTs in the light of
their socio-economic and political conditions (Nemer, 2018; Rangaswamy & Nair, 2012). As Nemer
(2018) suggests, this perspective places emphasis on the users of digital infrastructures, ‘positing
that people themselves define the value of these services in their lives.’ (462)
It is worth pointing out that my fieldwork in Kakuma started in the wake of a terror attack staged
by the Somali Islamist militant organization al-Shabaab on Nairobi’s Westgate mall on 21 September
2013 in which 71 people lost their lives. To quell the anxieties of the Kenyan citizens, the government
of Kenya (GoK) threatened to repatriate Somali refugees to Somalia (BBC, 2013) and further securi-
tized its refugee policy, based on confinement in camps. Before travelzing to Kakuma, I had received
the approval of the GoK Department of Refugee Affairs and UNHCR officials on site. However, the
exceptional circumstances following the Westgate terror attack added a further layer of scrutiny to
my movements and meetings across the camp.6
This article draws on interviews with 40 Somali refugees in Kakuma and 12 in Nairobi who regu-
larly traveled to Kakuma to visit their families. Furthermore, I organized two mixed male/female focus
group discussions in Kakuma. The face-to-face interviews and the FGDs were primarily aimed at iden-
tifying patterns of exploitation and dependence within the Somali community.
The fieldwork in Kakuma was conducted between October and November 2013, but the data I
collected in the camp were matched against the knowledge I had gleaned during 11 months in Nair-
obi’s Eastleigh area, also known as Little Mogadishu because of the large presence of Somali refugees
and Kenyan Somalis, between April 2013 and March 2014, with subsequent visits in 2016, 2017 and
2018. I also draw on interviews with 14 Ethiopians, Congolese and South Sudanese refugees, Somali
traders (10 in Kakuma and 23 in Eastleigh), and 12 UN and NGOs workers. As I interviewed humani-
tarian workers to understand their perspective on the biometric system of identification, I tried to
capture the way the biometric assemblage did not reflect a monolithic logic of aid distribution but
was rather the outcome of a negotiation between the UNHCR and the WFP.
While, in Eastleigh, I had the opportunity to regularly meet with my informants and collect data
both in interviews and during everyday interactions, the data collection in Kakuma was exclusively
based on semi-structured interviews. In both contexts, the interviews were conducted with the
help of Somali translators, who also acted as researcher assistants. Given the sensitivity of the
issues at the center of my study, I had extensively reflected on the kind of approach to be used in
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the field and how to maintain cultural and individual sensitivity before starting my fieldwork, in dis-
cussions with Somali leaders in Eastleigh, UNHCR protection officers, and agents of Refugees United,
a Danish NGO operating in Kakuma 3 which provided me with contacts in the field. Being introduced
by well-known and trusted members of the Somali community was crucial to ensure the informed
consent of the participants and reassure them that I would have complied with the requirement
of anonymity. In both interviews and FGDs, no participant was pressed to answer to my questions
or join the discussion. No minor was interviewed or included in the FGDs. All the contributions
were fully anonymised. The data collected during the interviews and FGDs were grouped into core
themes and analysed using Nvivo qualitative software.
There were some clear limits to my data collection. In the FGDs, female participants were averagely
less active than male in taking the floor, although some women stood up and lead the discussion. Also,
some pieces of information were for me impossible to verify. For instance, many respondents argued
that Kakuma hosted an undetermined number of Somali Kenyans who had been pushed by adverse
circumstances (such as having lost their cattle because of drought) to seek humanitarian aid by claiming
to have been displaced from Somalia. Although none of the refugees I met in both FGD and one-to-one
interviews self-identified as a member of this category, several refugees and UNHCR protection officers
referred to this group of crypto-Kenyan citizens when reflecting on the implications of the biometric
program. Nevertheless, in my analysis, I stress that no data is available to corroborate this information.
Setting the context
A mix of control, mistrust and repression has characterized the historic Somali condition in Kenya vis-
à-vis the Kenyan state since Independence. In 1963, when an insurgency in the Northern Frontier Dis-
trict, a semi-arid area that was once part of Somalia, before this latter was ceded to the British by the
Italians, prompted Kenya’s President Jomo Kenyatta to declare a state of emergency in the entire dis-
trict. The ensuing three-year war, remembered as the shifta war after the local word for bandit that
Kenyatta used to label the insurgents, was bound to leave an open sore between Kenya and its citi-
zens of Somali origin (Weitzberg, 2017).
Since the onset of the Somali displacement to Kenya triggered by the collapse of the Somali state
in 1991, advocacy organizations have criticized the Kenyan authorities for the treatment of Somali
refugees, contributing to creating an enabling environment for the targeting of vulnerable refugees
by predatory security officers (HRW, 2010; Otunnu, 1992; Teff & Yarnell, 2012). The rise of al-Shabaab
in Somalia in 2006 further worsened the popular perception of Somalis in Kenya. Increasing insecurity
in the borderlands and humanitarian spaces foreshadowed the risk of a spillover of the Somali
conflict into Kenya. Security concerns seeped into refugee policies, to the point where public dis-
courses in Kenya conflated the two issues and Somali refugees were increasingly portrayed by
Kenyan politicians and media as a potential fifth column of al-Shabaab (Okungu, 2011). In the after-
math of the Westgate siege, the government of Uhuru Kenyatta agreed with its Somali counterpart
and the UNHCR to the repatriation of more than 500,000 Somali refugees currently living in the
country (UNHCR, 2015).7 The announcement of repatriation sowed apprehension among refugees,
both in urban areas and in the two Kenyan refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma.
Kakuma refugee camp is located in the outskirts of Kakuma town, the largest urban center in northern
Turkana, along the road linking Kitale to the South Sudanese border, and is jointly managed by UNHCR
and the Camp Manager’s Office of the GoK Ministry of Refugee Affairs. At the time of my fieldwork, in
2013, the complex hosted approximately 180,000 refugees from 20 different countries in four camps:
Kakuma 1, the first camp to be established, Kakuma 2 and Kakuma 3 (UNHCR, 2015). Kakuma 4 was
established in December 2013, after my fieldwork, to accommodate South Sudanese displaced, who
have since outnumbered Somali refugees. In November 2013, the UNHCR in Kakuma had registered
53,890 Somali refugees (26,609 female and 27,281 male). However, several humanitarian workers
warned that this number, and any refugee population numbers, was not reliable as it was well
known that an undefined number of refugees, despite being registered in the camp, lived elsewhere.
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Kakuma 1 was the business hub of the camp, also known as Mogadishu because of the commercial
dominance of businesspeople from dominant Somali clans.8 The area featured a variety of shops –
mostly owned by Somalis and, in smaller part, Ethiopians – selling clothes, mobile phones and elec-
tronics, TV booths and drinking dens. Most of the goods traded in the camp were shipped from
Nairobi, while local Turkana pastoralists provided the meat for sale in the area. The source of the cash
circulating in the camp was mainly remittances or, as suggested by the presence of bags of rice and
flour labeled WFP in shops in Nairobi, the sale of foodstuff.
It was also to curb the sale of food rations that, in June 2013, UNHCR and WFP launched BIMS in
Kakuma.9 The rationale of the project was elucidated in a report that a UNHCR protection officer
shared with me. According to the document,
The lack of a rigorous identification method leaves the process open to abuse. Ration cards may be passed on and
used by non-refugees, or by refugees already holding a card. Some refugees unofficially return to their home
countries and most deaths are unreported until verification exercises are held; in the meantime, the ration
cards continue to be used to access services in the camps, including food. Ration cards also risk being stolen
or taken from their legitimate owners and used to receive food rations until reporting and de-registering are com-
pleted. These abuses result in the sale of a portion of relief food on local markets.10
The implementation of the BIMS pilot in Kakumawasmeant to strengthen the identity verification system
by introducing, alongside the scan of the barcode of the food card, also a fingerprint check. Figure 1.
The distribution procedure for food consisted of 5 steps:
Subsequent reports have taken stock of the limits and shortcomings of BIMS and modified the
model accordingly. According to a survey conducted by WFP in November 2014, 77 per cent of refu-
gees polled were satisfied with how the new controls had been implemented, and 60 per cent
responded that the new procedures made food distribution faster and more orderly.11
However, as I verified in a follow up in 2016 among Somali refugees registered in Kakuma but
living in Eastleigh, most of the issues I highlight in this paper have, to the date, not been fully
addressed. In the next section, where I present the main findings from the fieldwork, I will discuss
the perception of BIMS’ implications for refugee livelihood.
Findings
Repatriation anxieties and limitation of movement
Somali refugees in Kakuma interviewed for this study expressed the fear that BIMS could be used to
tighten police control over their movement. The launch of BIMS coincided with fresh announcements
of the Kenyan government to repatriate Somali refugees. These announcements further reinforced
Figure 1. Food Distribution Procedure.
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the perception of BIMS as an instrument to prevent those who would be transferred to Somalia from
re-entering Kenya and seeking assistance again as refugees. When, in the meeting in Kakuma 1, an
authoritative Somali elder asked: ‘What are you going to do with our fingerprints? What if we need to
travel elsewhere and then we want to come back?12’, murmurs of approval filled the space of the
gathering. His comments were often echoed during the interviews.
‘What if we are forced to leave Somalia again? People there continue dying every day. Wemay go back and things
could be fine for a while, but you never know what could happen in the future. Things are very uncertain’ (Inter-
view #1413).
This concern were shared particularly by those refugees originating from areas in Somalia still
ravaged by the Al Shabaab insurgency. During the FGDs in Kakuma 3, Somali Bantu refugees from
the area of Southern Somalia comprised between the rivers Shabelle and Juba, at the time firmly
under the control of the Islamist movement, were particularly anxious about the possibility of
being denied assistance if they were forced to flee Somalia again. Among these was A., a 50-year-
old from Buale, in Middle Juba who was held in great esteem by other Bantu refugees.
‘I left my farm on the bank of the river when my mango trees were destroyed, my father was strangled and one of
my three wives was raped. I have spent many years in Dadaab before being transferred here. I’m still waiting for
resettlement. I speak sometimes with my brother, who is still in Buale, and he tells me that the situation is bad one
day and worse the next. If I go back to Somalia I cannot return to my land. I will end up in a camp outside Moga-
dishu, which is worse than here. If I want to come back here I will have to burn my fingertips, otherwise I will be
sent back again’ [FGD#2]
A.’s reference to erasing his fingerprints by applying chemicals to or sanding off the fingertips to avoid
the risk of being re-identified by the Kenyan security is common also to refugees registered in the camp
but regularly traveling to urban centers. In an FGD in Kakuma, several participants, including local busi-
nessmen, stressed the importance of being able to travel to Nairobi for medical check-ups, attending
school, or looking for business opportunities. During an FGD in Kakuma 1, several participants shared
the anxieties of O., a Somali Darood refugee from Galkayo, in central Somalia.
‘What happens if the police stop me in Eastleigh and check my fingerprints and realise that I should be in
Kakuma? Will they cut my food rations? If they see that I don’t live in Kakuma anymore, I may lose the right to
resettlement.’ (FGD#1)
There was a widespread concern was that, once their fingerprints were recorded in the camp, the
refugees stopped and identified by the Kenyan police in Nairobi would be sanctioned, lose the
right to reside in Kakuma and, with it, many believed, a fast-track to resettlement (although this
belief, as confirmed by UNHCR officers, was unfounded). Also, some refugees pointed out that
being registered in the camp would prevent them from seeking business opportunities elsewhere.
One of these refugees was F., a young woman I first met in Kampala, Uganda, and then in Nairobi.
Although still registered as a resident of Kakuma, F. regularly traveled between Kenya and
Uganda, having built a reputation as a respected seller of fabrics in Eastleigh, where she had
moved three years earlier, and later in Kisenyi, an area of the Ugandan capital (Iazzolino & Hersi, 2019).
Will they check my fingerprints at Busia [a crossing point between Kenya and Uganda] if they see
that I’m a resident of Kakuma? Will they let me cross into Uganda or they will send me back to
Kakuma? (Interview #314)
Another young refugee interviewed in Kakuma 3 raised the concern that the UNHCR would share
its database with the Kenyan government and the police would stop him on the way to Nairobi,
where he regularly traveled to look for work, and send him back to Kakuma.
Identification of Kenyan Somali citizens
During the FGDs, several participants remarked that the UNHCR biometric system would allow sin-
gling out Kenyan Somali citizens.15 It is widely known among both the humanitarian personnel
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and refugees in the camp that a large number of Kenyan Somali citizens claim to be refugees to
benefit from the assistance of humanitarian organizations, although there are no data on the size
of this population. In the course of my fieldwork, I have not had the opportunity to interview any resi-
dent of the camp self-identifying as a Kenyan citizen. However, UNHCR workers were aware that
drought and other natural disasters regularly pushed ethnic Somali pastoralists from the North-
Eastern Province of the country mostly to Dadaab and, to a limited extent, to Kakuma in search of
assistance. Some of these humanitarian workers evoked fairness as the leading principle of the
program, thus couching the rationale of the biometric shift in moral terms. As a UNHCR protection
officer said,
‘It is a matter of fairness, because not everybody is entitled to aid. Those who are claiming aid without being refu-
gees, or using the card of someone else are robbing other refugees’ (Interview #1316)
The representative of another international organization linked BIMS to the need to circumscribe the
population of concern of the humanitarian system by identifying Kenyan Somalis trying to pass for
people displaced from Somalia
‘There are many Kenyans to claim to be refugees. I understand that they too need help, but it should be the state
to support them, not us. We cannot do the job of the state. (Interview #1517)
The participants of an FGD in Kakuma 1 also suggested that Kenyan Somalis trying to pass for refu-
gees would try to sand off their fingerprints to avoid being identified as Kenyan citizens.
Loss of income
Somali refugees from minority groups proved particularly concerned with the implications of the bio-
metric verification for the possibility to access much-needed cash. The cash was used for diet diver-
sification (like purchasing goat meat from Turkana pastoralists, firewood or charcoal) or invested in
small entrepreneurship initiatives, such as setting up a shop. It was also necessary for purchasing
phone credit, to pay for transport to the UNHCR compound and the market in Kakuma 1 and to
travel to cities to undergo medical visits.
Although money transfer operators and mobile money kiosks were present in the camp, mostly
clustered in Kakuma 1, not all refugees had equal access to remittances. The trade of food rations
was a critical source of cash for those refugees, such as Somali Bantu refugees, with no or very
limited access to remittances from abroad. Most Somali Bantu households practices a split house-
hold strategy, in which a household member, typically a young male, would move to the city
looking for work. If he was also the registered head of the household, his card could be used by
another member of the family and his food ration could be resold to the traders in Kakuma 1 or
used to pay local Turkana pastoralists in exchange for goat meat. In some cases, it was an entire
household to relocate elsewhere, leaving their food cards with relatives who could then collect
and sell their food package. It was widely feared that the introduction of BIMS risked disrupting
this widespread strategy.
A., a Somali Bantu refugee in his twenties, had recently moved with his spouse and young son to
Eastleigh, where I met him. In the past, since he was registered as the head of the household, he had
simply to leave his card with his mother, who still lived in Kakuma 3 with her other daughters.
We need that money because we don’t have anybody to rely on. I can work here [in Eastleigh] as an English
teacher but I don’t earn enough to support my family and my mother. With my wife, we decided to move
here together so that my mother could use our card and make a little money and open a little shop in the
camp. Now she has to go through the procedure to become the head [of the household], but she has barely
the money to take a piki-piki [mototaxi] to travel to the UNHCR office. How will she buy meat and pasta? She
cannot even use our card. (Interview #518)
In an FGD19 held in Kakuma 3, Somali Bantu women confirmed that 1 Kg of rice or wheat flour pro-
vided by the UNHCR could be resold to traders in Kakuma 1 for 30 KSh. While it was possible to
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register the change of the household composition at the UNHCR compound, most refugees con-
sidered the procedure cumbersome and time-consuming. Moreover, as in the case of A.’s mother,
traveling from Kakuma 3 to the UNHCR offices entailed paying for the transport.
Worsening conditions of indebtedness
The shift to the biometric system of verification thus deprived refugees left to their own devices of a
critical source of income. As a result, several interviewees anticipated a worsening of relations of
dependence and indebtedness that already tied many Somali Bantu refugees (mostly women) to
Somali households from dominant clans in Kakuma 1 and 2. The chores that most participants to
the FGD were required to do included cleaning latrines, plastering house walls and collecting
firewood. One of the participants said that
‘depending on the task, they would pay me up to 150 KSh (1.5 USD) per day, but often I have to work to repay
debts for money I have already borrowed. (FGD #220)
There was a widespread agreement that linking the distribution of food aid to the biometric verifica-
tion was already forcing many women, who were no longer able to resell the extra food rations of
absentee household members, to borrow money from better-off Somalis. Another participant to
the FGD reported having worked for three months in the past to repay a 1000 KSh (10 USD)
debt.21 Since she could no longer use the food card of his brother and needed cash to purchase
canned food and meat, she had recently sought help from the same family she had previously
worked for. Despite having suffered harassment from this family in the past, she had refrained
from reporting the abuses to the UNHCR because of the lack of alternative sources of income.
Discussion
The reflections around BIMS that refugees shared in the meetings and in the interviews upon which
this article is built revealed the intense interpretative work on infrastructures, meaning ‘different
things for different groups’ (Star, 1999).
Two main themes emerged from my ethnography:
1) the shift to a biometric system of identification was largely perceived as a constraint to refugees’
agency and instrumental to tighten control on refugee mobility;
2) the implications of the efficiency logic underlying the deployment of the biometric system of
identification were viewed as particularly alarming by historically marginalized groups within
the Somali refugee community, who feared that their condition of subordination could be
exacerbated.
Mobility constraints
Somali refugees framed BIMS as an extension of the Kenyan security apparatus. The refugees’ per-
spectives went beyond the solutionist veneer to achieve greater efficiency and accountability to
shed light on, and call into question, the underlying political rationality of the project (Larkin,
2013). The biometric verification system was largely perceived as an instrument of mobility
control. Refugees anticipated what Ajana (2013a) calls biometrics’ function creep, ‘whereby techni-
quest hat were initially adopted for specific uses and purposes have beengradually spreading into
much wider spheres and practices of governance’ (576), placing the issue ‘within a wider political per-
spective and in light of biometrics’ spillover from exceptional domains and uses into the entire
migrant/asylum body’(591). Furthermore, biometric technologies interact with what Newhouse
(2015), in her study of South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma, calls ‘the violence of verification’, in
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which BIMS reinforce the impact of headcounts in ‘fixing refugees in place and containing their
movement’ (2296).
The perception of function creep of biometric verification infrastructures is not uncommon in
humanitarian crisis, as recent cases in camps for displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh (Thomas,
2018) and Yemeni in Yemen’s Huthi-controlled areas (El Yaakoubi & Barrington, 2019) clearly show.
The concern that sensitive information might be shared with actors that, in case of forced repatria-
tion, would use it to prevent those fleeing Somalia from accessing humanitarian aid again shaped the
position of the refugees vis-à-vis the biometric registration process.
The refugees’ anticipation of function creep was not misplaced. Although none of the intervie-
wees working for international organizations linked BIMS to security, the camp manager, a Kenyan
Somali, was quite adamant that the logic behind the biometric system of identification was
aligned with the GoK policy of encampment and with the renewed efforts, in the aftermath of the
Westgate terror attack, to police refugees’ movements.
‘The policy is clear: refugees must reside in the camp. They are not supposed to travel outside the camp. There has
been tolerance for a long time, but now the situation has changed. With what happened in Westgate we need to
keep our eyes open.’ (Interview #822)
Furthermore, the camp manager anticipated that the GoK would have in the future a greater involve-
ment in the management of BIMS and gain full access to the biometric data of the refugees. The GoK
had been pressing international organizations to share refugee data for a long time because of both
the national security agenda and donors conditionalities (Jacobsen, 2016, 2017). At the geopolitical
level, the securitization of the Somali population in Kenya should be seen in the context of the
broader global agenda that, in the post-September 11 scenarios, strengthened the security-develop-
ment nexus (Faist, 2005). For a country such as Kenya, located on the front line of the so-called War on
Terror because of its proximity to Somalia, a ‘failed state’ in most geopolical narratives and a potential
breeding ground for terrorists in policy discourse, donors’ conditionalities were attached to the com-
mitment to side with the US in the fight against terrorism (Bachman & Hönke, 2010). For instance, a
2009 US cable released by Wikileaks revealed that the US government pressured the GoK to improve
the identification of ‘terrorists posing as refugees by biometrically register all refugees near the
Somali border and to cross-check this data with the US’ Terrorist Interdiction Program’ (Jacobsen,
2017). After Kenya launched a military operation in southern Somalia against Al Shabab, thus trigger-
ing an escalating sequence of terror attacks and counter-terrorism measures targeting the Somali
refugee population, the government pressure increased until, in 2017, Kenya’s Refugee Affairs Sec-
retariat (RAS), supported by UNHCR, took over the reception, registration, documentation, refugee
status determination (RSD) and refugee management (UNHCR, 2020).
Reproduction of power relations
The dependency of most Somali Bantu on the sale of food rations of absentee household members
made them particularly vulnerable to the unanticipated consequences of policies to curtail the diver-
sion of humanitarian aid. The implementation of BIMS was thus regarded by most Somali Bantu par-
ticipants as likely to exacerbate their condition of subordination to Somali traders from dominant
clans. The importance of selling food rations helps explain why, as I mentioned in the introduction,
some elders suggested accompanying the introduction of the biometric registration with an increase
in food rations.
The rollout of the biometric food distribution program integrated the double aim of policing and
protecting with the purpose to increase efficiency and effectivity by regulating who has access to
assistance (Fassin, 2012). Humanitarian practices produce categories to render refugees more
legible (Scott, 1998) and sift ‘vulnerable victims’ from ‘cunning crooks’ (Horst, 2006). This distinction
also highlights the gulf between the normative assumptions of the humanitarian apparatus and the
practices enacted by recipients of aid to increase their agency. Biometric assemblages are shaped by,
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and operate according to, procedures that incapsulate rigid moral categories, premised on what is
licit and illicit, right and wrong, according to which humanitarian actors classify specific practices
and behaviors. Yet, the moral economy on the ground was more nuanced. Playing the system
may be seen as particularly necessary by members of some groups, such as Somali Bantu, who
had very limited support from outside the camp in the form of remittances from the diaspora or
business partnerships.
Forms of ‘refugee cheating’ have been an object of study in several humanitarian settings
(Kibreab, 1991; Oka, 2014; Pérouse de Montclos & Mwangi Kagwanja, 2000). Kumsa (2006) interprets
refugee cheating in terms of entrepreneurship, while Harrell-Bond (2004) suggests that ‘perhaps the
ubiquitous welfare cheating of the aid regime that occurs in refugee camps could be interpreted as
evidence of the re-development of ‘solidarity’ among these populations’ (27). In Kakuma, Jansen
(2008) observes,
refugees were used to UNHCR and NGO employees and police officers accepting or asking for bribes – ‘TKK’was a
well-known phrase: toa kitu kidogo in Kiswahili, meaning ‘bring something small’: it was part of the system as they
knew it. Perhaps this explains why some people thought that the only way of organising resettlement was by
cheating (575)
As Newhouse (2015) argues, in refugee camps, ‘illicit economic activities (such as brewing alcohol and
selling rations) are at once material strategies to improve living standards, and practical political cri-
tiques that contest the sufficiency of humanitarian assistance ‘(2293). The anxiety of Somali refugees
stemmed from the awareness that, by enforcing encampment as the mandatory condition to receive
aid, BIMS limited their movements outside of the camp and, consequently, their ability to pursue live-
lihood opportunities and life aspirations. For communities with a long history of marginalization, such
as the Somali Bantu, the crackdown on the food sale collided with the rhetoric of self-reliance much-
touted by aid agencies (Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018), further worsening the dependency on
humanitarian support and the vulnerability to exploitative working conditions at the service of
better-off refugees.
The humanitarian workers interviewed for this study emphasized that BIMS was likely to increase
efficiency minimizing the risk of aid diversion and better sort the legitimate recipients from the ille-
gitimate ones.23 Before being an object of interpretation by refugees, BIMS meant different things for
the different stakeholders involved in its design and implementation. Moreover, the reflection on the
pilot brought to the fore conflicting views on humanitarian governmentality among the stakeholders.
Commenting on the aim of curbing the trade of foodstuff, a UNHCR officer said:
WFP is very strict when it comes to money. They say no. For them, it’s only foodstuff and other types of in-kind. We
think differently because we know that refugees need money sometimes and not all of them receive help from
abroad. But we need to find a compromise with the other agencies, with the government. The way we operate is
given by a mediation among different agendas. We need to find common ground with the government to con-
tinue our job of assisting refugees in Kenya. (Interview #1024)
Moreover, reflecting on whether biometrics reduces fraud, a report by The Engine Room and Oxfam
(2018) concludes that ‘using biometrics on beneficiaries only allows for accountability checks to be
done at the ‘downstream’ part of the process’ (8), but does not address issues of aid diversion
along the supply chain. Thus, biometrics risks putting ‘the burden of accountability checks on the
beneficiaries, when the real problems with fraud are elsewhere in the ecosystem’ (ibid.).
Conclusions
In this article, I have examined how Somali refugees make sense of biometric infrastructures of ver-
ification. I have suggested that humanitarian actors deploy biometrics as a disciplining technology
that reflects ideal categories of licit and illicit to determine who is entitled to aid and who is not.
In so doing, they gloss over the way structural inequalities force members of specific communities
to blur the boundaries of these categories. I have also sought to link the issue of biopolitical
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technologies to the broader discussion on the digitization and datafication of identity finalized to the
allocation of services and resources. The unintended consequences of biometric-based initiatives to
digitize identity are amplified by the ambiguous role of the refugee camp as a device shaped by mul-
tiple, and often diverging, rationalities and sources of authority, and characterized by a tension
between protecting and controlling the population of concern. I have thus conceptualized biometrics
as an infrastructure of compassionate repression to go beyond the materiality of infrastructures and
to understand the significance of the socio-political context in shaping the way they are perceived by
the stakeholders. In the state of exception that characterizes the condition of ethnic Somalis in Kenya,
the perception of function creep further erodes the trust relationship between the humanitarian
sector and the recipients of aid.
Despite the declared aim of harnessing the potential of biometrics to extend social protection and
render ‘legible’ to the state segments of the population previously invisible, in some case this goal has
proved to be controversial. There is, therefore, the need to approach biometric assemblages not
simply as a technological solution to improve efficiency and accuracy in the management practices
of information systems, but also as devices to reformat an otherwise complex reality to make it
accountable to the donors – often at the expense of the recipients of aid. Ignoring contextual
dynamics when rolling out biometric systems for aid distribution in volatile settings rises critical
issues as refugee policies are securitized by host states. Furthermore, the disciplining function of bio-
metric systems of identification risks weighing particularly on communities for which playing the
system is the only way to overcome livelihood constraints. This is why we need to broaden the
gaze from the individual recipients to the social networks in which they are embedded, and upon
which their livelihoods depend.
By suggesting that biometric systems of identification unevenly affect different socio-economic
groups, I have argued that the case here examined throws in sharp relief the risk that the fixation
on manageability would lead to the oversimplification of contextual, historical information, a critical
issue that should be accounted for in debates on digital identity. This is particularly the case for those
groups whose identity and livelihoods are entangled. By affecting the livelihoods and the socio-econ-
omic practices of specific groups – livelihoods and practices that are stigmatized by humanitarian
actors – the design, set up and management of infrastructures to digitize and verify identities risk
contributing to the protracted marginalization of these communities. Neglecting the risk of function
creep and the significance of entrenched relations of dominance and subordination in the design and
implementation of biometric systems of identification can undermine the moral authority of
humanitarianism.
Notes
1. An internal report anticipated that, once scaled up to the entire camp, the system would lead to a decrease of an
estimate 5–10 percent in the number of refugees eligible for food assistance and to a reduction of the food
requirements by 6,000-12,000 mt per year, with an estimated saving of USD 6–12 million (calculating the cost
of delivering 1 mt of food of US$1,000). The initial implementation costs of the system were expected to be
recouped in the first year following the rollout, with substantial savings in subsequent years.
2. Refugees in the other sectors of the camp continued using, for the time being, the standard ration card without
photo or biometric data which allowed the head of the household to collect food rations at the Food Distribution
Centers (FDCs), but it was generally known that the pilot was destined to be scaled up.
3. In October 2013, most refugees came from South Sudan (86,800), Somalia (55,825), Sudan (9,150) and DRC (8,800)
(UNHCR, 2015).
4. informant #16, a UNHCR protection officer in Kakuma (29 October 2013).
5. Despite the fact that, since 2014, international humanitarian assistance has increased by 30% to the current USD
28.9 billion (Urquhart, 2019), this assistance has been increasingly spread thin as a result of the multiplication and
intensification of humanitarian crises worldwide.
6. I was monitored in particular by the camp manager, a Kenyan Somali from the Darood Ogaden clan who, accord-
ing to all my Somali informants, both Bantu and from other clans, had business linkages with Kakuma’s most influ-
ential Somali entrepreneurs, who belonged to his same clan.
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7. UNHCR, Tripartite Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the Federal
Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Governing the Voluntary Repatria-
tion of Somali Refugees Living in Kenya, 2013, 10 November 2013.
8. Clanship represents the main identifier in Somali society. In very broad strokes, even since before the collapse of
the state, in the diaspora and in post-war Somalia, power has been concentrated in the hands of members of two
clans in particular – Darood and Hawiye. It is to these two groups that I refer when I, or the informants, use the
expression ‘dominant clans’.
9. Since the early 2000s, the UNHCR has used biometric technologies (mainly fingerprinting and iris scanning) to
register its population of concern for “one-to-one” verification. In 2013 (the year in which I conducted the
study on which this paper is based), a UNHCR policy document described biometric registration as a strategic
decision (UNHCR 2013: 1). Moreover, donors, USAID and WFP above all, have encouraged implementing NGOs
to adopt biometrics systems of identification to meet accountability requirements. As to 2018, UNHCR has
deployed (BIMS) in 52 countries (UNHCR, 2015), registering the fingerprints and, in the latest stage of the initiative,
scanning the iris of more than six million refugees.
10. Internal document.
11. However, a 2015 internal UNHCR audit report on BIMS pointed at the lack of a full understanding of data protec-
tion policies, as evident in missing encryption tools in the laptops used by the litigation staff and the lack security
testing of the network against unauthorized intrusions (Thomas, 2018).
12. During these meetings, the refugees spoke their own language and their interventions were translated into
English in real time.
13. Mohamed from Mogadishu, 12 November 2013
14. 28 August 2013
15. FGD #1 (9 November 2013) #2 (11 November 2013)
16. 9 November 2013
17. 12 November 2013
18. 2 September 2013
19. FGD #2 (11 November 2013)
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. 2 November 2013
23. This forecast was confirmed by a 2015 assessment report which found that “the project led to substantial
food distribution savings estimated at USD 1.4 million per month, and a return on investment of the
project of approximately 1300 per cent over five years. Overall, this contributed to a reduction of 21
per cent of the population receiving food assistance between September 2013 and May 2014” (UNHCR,
2015).
24. 10 November 2013
Acknowledgements
The author would like to express his gratitude to the many people who participated in this study in Kakuma and
Nairobi. He is also grateful to the organization Refugee United, the UNHCR and the Kenyan Department of Refugee
Affairs. Finally, he would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors of this special issue for their
helpful comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number 1091693] and the Institute of Money,
Technology and Financial Inclusion - University of California Irvine, CA [Subaward No. 2013-2929].
Notes on contributor
Gianluca Iazzolino is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Department of International Department based at the Firoz
Lalji Centre for Africa. His research mainly focuses on digital technologies, humanitarianism and the informal economy in
Africa. He is particularly interested in how information and value circulate and in the role of digital platforms in the Global
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT 15
South in reshaping processes of inclusion and exclusion and instigating new forms of organization and practices of
contestation.
References
Agier, M. (2011). Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government. Polity.
Ajana, B. (2013a). Asylum, identity management and biometric control. Journal of Refugee Studies, 26(4), 576–595. https://
doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fet030
Ajana, B. (2013b). Governing through biometrics: The biopolitics of identity. Palgrave Macmillan.
Amoore, L. (2006). Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror. Political Geography, 25(3), 336–351.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.02.001
Amoore, L., & de Goede, M. (2008). Transactions after 9/11: The banal face of the preemptive strike. Transactions of the
Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 33, 173–185. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2008.00291.x
Amoore, L., & Hall, A. (2009). Taking people apart: Digitised dissection and the body at the border. Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space, 27(3), 444–464. https://doi.org/10.1068/d1208
Bachmann, J., & Honke, J. (2010). ’Peace and security’ as counterterrorism? The political effects of liberal interventions in
Kenya. African Affairs, 109(434), 97–114. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adp069
BBC. (2013). Kenya to repatriate Somali refugees. 11 November.Retrieved February 10, 2018, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-20819462
Collier, S. J. (2011). Post-soviet social: Neoliberalism, social modernity, biopolitics. Princeton University Press.
Crampton, J. W. (2019). Platform biometrics. Surveillance & Society, 17(1/2), 54–62. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v17i1/2.
13111
Denzin, N. K. (2001). Interpretive interactionism conclusion: On interpretive interactionism. In Interpretive interactionism
(pp. 57–69). London: SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412984591
Donovan, K. P. (2015). Infrastructuring aid : Materializing social protection in Northern Kenya. Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space, 33(333), 732–748.
Duran, J. (2010). Virtual borders, data aliens, and bare bodies: Culture, securitization, and the biometric state. Journal of
Borderlands Studies, 25(3–4), 219–230. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2010.9695783
Easton-Calabria, E., & Omata, N. (2018). Panacea for the refugee crisis? Rethinking the promotion of “self-reliance” for refu-
gees. Third World Quarterly, 6597, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1458301
El Yaakoubi, A., & Barrington, L. (2019, June 4). Yemen’s Houthis and WFP dispute aid control as millions starve.
Reutershttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-wfp/yemens-houthis-and-wfp-dispute-aid-control-as-
millions-starve-idUSKCN1T51YO
The Engine Room and Oxfam. (2018). Biometrics in the Humanitarian Sector. https://theengineroom.org
Faist, T. (2005). The migration-security nexus: international migration and security before and after 9/11. (COMCAD Working
Papers, 9). Universität Bielefeld, Fak. für Soziologie, Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD).
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-378981
Fassin, D. (2005). Compassion and repression: The moral economy of immigration policies in France. Cultural
Anthropology, 20(3), 362–387. https://doi.org/10.1525/can.2005.20.3.362
Fassin, D. (2012). Humanitarian reason. A moral history of the present. University of California Press.
Foucault, M. (2007). Security, territory, population. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978. Palgrave Macmillan.
Gelb, A., & Clark, J. (2013). “Identification for Development:The Biometrics Revolution.” Working Papers 315, Center for
Global Development.
Goldkuhl, G. (2012). Pragmatism vs interpretivism in qualitative information systems research. European Journal of
Information Systems, 21(2), 135–146. https://doi.org/10.1057/ejis.2011.54
Harrell-Bond, B. (2004). Response to Kibreab. Journal of Refugee Studies, 17(1), 27–28. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/17.1.27
Horst, C. (2006). Introduction: Refugee livelihoods: Continuity and transformations. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 25(2), 6–22.
https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0122
Human Rights Watch. (2010). Welcome to Kenya: Police Abuse of Somali Refugees. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from www.
hrw.org/reports/2010/06/17/welcome-kenya-0
Iazzolino, G. (2020). Power geometries of encampment. The reproduction of domination and marginality among Somali
refugees in Kakuma. Geoforum; Journal of Physical, Human, and Regional Geosciences, 110, 25–34. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.geoforum.2020.01.010
Iazzolino, G., & Hersi, M. (2019). Shelter from the Storm: Somali migrant networks in Uganda between international
business and regional geopolitics. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 13(3), 371–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/
17531055.2019.1575513
Jacobsen, K. L. (2016). UNHCR, accountability and refugee biometrics. In K. B. Sandvik & K. L. Jacobsen (Eds.), UNHCR and
the struggle for accountability (pp. 159–180). Routledge.
Jacobsen, K. L. (2017). On humanitarian refugee biometrics and new forms of intervention. Journal of Intervention and
Statebuilding, 11(4), 529–551. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2017.1347856
16 G. IAZZOLINO
Jacobsen, K. L., & Fast, L. (2019). Rethinking access: How humanitarian technology governance blurs control and care.
Disasters, 43(2), S151–S168. https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12333
Jansen, B. J. (2008). Between vulnerability and assertiveness: Negotiating resettlement in Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya.
African Affairs, 107(429), 569–587. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adn044
Kibreab, G. (1991). ‘Stranded ‘birds of Passage’? Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum’. Refuge: Canada’s Periodical
on Refugees, 10, 6–11.
Kumsa, M. K. (2006). ‘“No! I”m not a refugee!’ The poetics of be-longing among young Oromos in Toronto’. Journal of
Refugee Studies, 19(2), 230–255. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fel001
Larkin, B. (2004). Sounds: Nigerian video and the infrastructure of piracy. Public Culture, 16(2), 289–314.
Larkin, B. (2013). The politics and poetics of infrastructure. Annual Review of Anthropology, 42(1), 327–343.
Latonero, M., Hiatt, K., Napolitano, A., Clericetti, G., & Penagos, M. (2019). Digital Identity in the Migration & Refugee
Context. Data & Society. https://datasociety.net/library/digital-identity-in-the-migration-refugee-context/
Madianou, M. (2019). The biometric assemblage: Surveillance, experimentation, profit, and the measuring of refugee
bodies. Television and New Media, 20(6), 581–599.
Madison, D. S. (2012). Critical ethnography: Method, ethics, and performance (2nd ed.). Sage.
Maguire, M. (2009). The birth of biometric security. Anthropology Today, 25(2), 9–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8322.
2009.00654.x
Malkki, L. (2002). News from nowhere mass displacement and globalized “problems of organisation”. Ethnography, 3(3),
351–360. https://doi.org/10.1177/146613802401092797
Martin, A. K., & Donovan, K. P. (2015). New surveillance technologies and their publics: A case of biometrics. Public
Understanding of Science, 24(7), 842–857. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662513514173
Nemer, D. (2018). Wired mobile phones: The case of community technology centers in favelas of Brazil*. Information
Technology for Development, 24(3), 461–481. https://doi.org/10.1080/02681102.2018.1478383
Newhouse, L. S. (2015). More than mere survival: Violence, humanitarian governance, and practical material politics in a
Kenyan refugee camp. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 47(11), 2292–2307. https://doi.org/10.1068/
a140106p
Nishiyama, H. (2015). Towards a global genealogy of biopolitics: Race, colonialism, and biometrics beyond Europe.
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 33(2), 331–346. https://doi.org/10.1068/d19912
Oka, R. C. (2014). Coping with the refugee wait: The role of consumption, normalcy, and dignity in refugee lives at Kakuma
refugee camp, Kenya. American Anthropologist, 116(1), 23–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.12076
Okungu, J. (2011). Is Al Shabaab head in Somalia or Nairobi? The Star, 28, October. Retrieved May 22, 2015, from. http://
www.the-star.co.ke/opinions/jerry-okungu/46694-is-al-shabaab-head-in-somalia-or-nairobi
Otunnu, O. (1992). Factors affecting the treatment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees in Kenya: A historical
Overview. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 12(5), 21–26. https://doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.21678
Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2018). Hotspots and the geographies of humanitarianism. Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space, 0(0), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775818754884
Pérouse de Montclos, M. A., & Mwangi Kagwanja, P. (2000). Refugee camps or cities? The socio-economic dynamics of the
Dadaab and Kakuma camps in Northern Kenya. Journal of Refugee Studies, 13(2), 205–222. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/
13.2.205
Pilegaard, L. (2011, October). New technologies – always an improvement? Forced Migration Review. Issue, 38, 56.
Pugliese, J. (2010). Biometrics: Bodies, technologies, biopolitics. Routledge.
Rabinow, P., & Rose, N. (2006). Biopower Today. BioSocieties, 1(2), 195–217. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1745855206040014
Rangaswamy, N., & Nair, S. (2012). The PC in an Indian urban slum: Enterprise and entrepreneur-ship in ICT4D 2.0.
Information Technology for Development, 18(2), 163–180. https://doi.org/10.1080/02681102.2011.643211
Read, R., Taithe, B., & Mac Ginty, R. (2016). Data hubris? Humanitarian information systems and the mirage of technology.
Third World Quarterly, 37(8), 1314–1331. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1136208
Rose, N. (1999). Powers of freedom. Cambridge University Press.
Scott-Smith, T. (2016). Humanitarian neophilia: The “innovation turn” and its implications. Third World Quarterly, 37(12),
2229–2251. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1176856
Scott, J. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. Yale University Press.
Star, S. L. (1999). The ethnography of infrastructure. American Behavioral Scientist, 43(3), 377–391.
Taylor, L., & Broeders, D. (2015). In the name of development: Power, profit and the datafication of the global South.
Geoforum; Journal of Physical, Human, and Regional Geosciences, 64, 229–237. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.
2015.07.002
Tazzioli, M. (2019). ‘Refugees’ debit cards, subjectivities, and data circuits: Financial-humanitarianism in the Greek
migration laboratory’. International Political Sociology, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olz014
Teff, M., & Yarnell, M. (2012). Somali refugees: Ongoing crisis, new realities. Field Report, Refugee Internationa, March..
Thomas, E. (2018, March 12). Tagged, tracked and in danger: How the Rohingya got caught in the UN’s risky biometric data-
base. Wired. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/united-nations-refugees-biometric-database-rohingya-myanmar-
bangladesh
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT 17
Ticktin, M. (2011). How biology travels: A humanitarian trip. Body and Society, 17(2–3), 139–158. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1357034X11400764
UNHCR. (2015). Joint Inspection of the Biometrics Identification System for Food Distribution in Kenya. August.
UNHCR. (2020). Registration. Kenya. https://www.unhcr.org/ke/registration
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2013). “Request for proposal:No. RFP/2012/507 –
For the provision of a biometric identity management system.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Retrieved January 31, 2013, from http://www.unhcr.org/50c85dd69.pdf
Urquhart, A. (2019). Global humanitarian assistance report 2019. Development initiatives. https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/GHA%20report%202019_0.pdf
Von Schnitzler, A. (2008). Citizenship prepaid: Water, calculability, and techno-politics in South Africa. Journal of Southern
African Studies, 34(4), 899–917.
Walsham, G. (1993). Interpreting information systems in organisations. Wiley.
Weitzberg, K. (2017).We do not have borders: Greater Somalia and the predicaments of belonging in Kenya. Ohio University
Press.
White, O., Madgavkar, A., Manyika, J., Mahajan, D., Bughin, J., Mccarthy, M., & Sperling, O. (2019). Digital identification: A key
to inclusive growth. McKinsey Global Institute. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/
McKinsey%20Digital/Our%20Insights/Digital%20identification%20A%20key%20to%20inclusive%20growth/
MGIDigital-identification-Report.ashx
18 G. IAZZOLINO
